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Classifying states: instrumental rhetoric or a compelling 
normative theory? 
 
 
Abstract  
Many states use a classificatory approach to foreign policy: they put other states into 
particular categories and structure their engagement and relations partly as a result. 
And there is one prominent modern international political theory - Rawls' Law of 
Peoples - that seems to adopt this approach as an account of justified state behaviour. 
But should we expect this type of theory to ultimately prove attractive, justified and 
philosophically distinct compared to more instrumentalist rivals? This paper explores 
the challenges generic to any such account, not merely those relating to Rawls' 
specific version, and surveys possible responses and their shortcomings. 
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I. FOREIGN POLICY AND CLASSIFYING STATES1 
Many modern states appear to rely on a ‘classificatory approach’ to their foreign 
policy making, namely they identify other states as belonging to various categories  – 
human rights respecters, non-aggressors, dictatorships, democracies, allies, trade 
partners, “friendly” autocracies, and many more 2  – and use membership of such 
categories to structure how they approach a very wide range of interstate interactions. 
But does it actually make sense – normatively and conceptually speaking - to have a 
foreign policy that is guided by such classifications?3  
While the practice of classifying states as a way to structure foreign policy 
relations is reasonably widespread (Hermann and Fisherkeller 1995), very few 
appraisals of the general approach exist in the global justice literature or in 
international ethics more broadly.4 Furthermore, the few appraisals that do actually 
appear in the literature are centred on the question of how to operationalise state 
classificationism in a normatively credible way and have left the conceptual 
presuppositions of the approach largely unaddressed. This paper aims to fill this 
theoretical gap by surveying the main challenges “state classificationism” would face 
if it is to be a conceptually plausible and philosophically distinct theory of justified 
                                                        
1 We’re very grateful for comments from the two anonymous reviewers and the editors. The 
authors would also like to thank Carly Beckerman, Peter Jones, Erin Nash, Andrew Walton, 
and John Williams for comments.  
2 For an excellent overview see Hudson 2005.  
3 Readers familiar with the global justice literature will immediately relate this question to 
that of collective responsibility, see, for example, Miller (2007). Yet, while the two topics 
may be coterminous under some theories, they need not be. Members of a given political 
community need not necessarily be held responsible for how their state behaves internally and 
externally: the content of a foreign policy can be wholly directed at the governement of a 
state, or at its ruling elite or at different apsects of state institutions.  
4 On some of the issues related to operationalising a specific version see Forster (2014) and 
Doyle (2006). 
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international engagement. To be very, very, very clear: the question being examined 
here is not one in empirical comparative politics or international relations – it is not 
the question of how states actually behave and whether we can model such behaviour 
using state-classifications. This a relevant concern – as discussed subsequently – as it 
gives us reason to think that state classificationism as an approach has appeal to key 
real world actors. But the question we are asking is different in kind, and the huge 
literature looking at how states actually behave does not answer it. What we want to 
explore is whether the practice of classifying states can be theoretically justified as an 
attractive and distinct approach to international state-behaviour ethics without 
collapsing into well-known alternatives.  
Furthermore, the value of discussing the approach’s strengths and weaknesses 
in principle may also provide some clarity on the abuse of it in practice. Clearly 
existing states do classify other states for ideological reasons and for the pursuit of 
self-interest, this done with categories that are sometimes unreflectively influenced by 
power imbalances and elite norms.5 It would be helpful as such to know if the entire 
approach should be discounted or not, even if we recognise that it can be abused. 
Within normative political philosophy, Rawls’ (1999) The Law of Peoples 
(hereafter LP) potentially lends itself to be described as a form of state 
classificationism. How best to conceive of this work is an important issue, but to the 
extent possible we will try to be agnostic on this, thus the status of  LP will vary 
depending on the reader’s judgement. If she thinks it straightforwardly provides state 
or polity based conditions that determine a justified foreign policy it will serve as a 
direct example. Alternatively, if the reader judges it as providing an ideal theory in 
                                                        
5 See here for instance Teti (2012) on post-democratisation discourse, or Giannone (2010) on 
the ideological influences on the state rankings provided by Freedom House.  
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which different kinds of political communities are conceptualized as elements of a 
constructivist approach to the justification of a conception of international justice then 
it will serve as a referent, albeit one that may vary when applied. Furthermore, though 
we use the theory as an illustration, the overall argument doesn’t depend on the very 
specific suggestions Rawls makes.  
One way to thus view the task of this paper is by the following thought 
experiment: imagine Rawls had proposed a different classification of political 
communities, one that nonetheless did not collapse into an instrumentalist or some 
form of consequentialist theory. Clearly, much of the criticism of his (counterfactual) 
proposal would be different to the criticism he did face. But some types of problems 
might be common to any reasonably compelling version of such a theory. This is our 
focus here.  
The first part of this paper tries to produce a sympathetic reconstruction of the 
underlying assumptions that guide such classifications, notably relying on the idea 
that we can classify political communities given some of their “defining features”. We 
then go on to show that, despite the use of such classifications appearing to be quite 
widespread, the approach in general suffers from a number of underlying structural 
conceptual difficulties, with the two most significant being: a) completeness – that 
categories often comprise multiple criteria that need not correlate and often do not 
correlate, and as such do not necessarily yield threshold evaluations (that a state can 
be rightly regarded as a certain “type” because it fits the features of that type); and b) 
gradation – that adherence to categories is often by matter of degree not by the 
presence of a discrete feature.   
We assess these objections and suggest that there are at least potential 
solutions or modifications that would blunt the aforementioned difficulties. The 
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completeness problem can in principle be addressed by using some sort of lexical 
ordering of the moral principles underlying international relations, though the 
question of how to philosophically justify the precise ranking is a difficult one. And, 
in theory at least, if a state’s divergent evaluations are based on its behaviour in 
different “realms” then this might be addressed by having different spheres of 
engagement – that is a polity might have a close relationship with another state in one 
sphere, and an antagonistic relationships with it in another. The gradation problem 
could in theory be overcome by replacing threshold conditions with judgements based 
on family resemblances or “distance” to various ideal types.  
We conclude, however, by noting that, while in principle addressing the 
difficulties, there are possible downsides concerning the reformulated approach’s 
ability to be both theoretically compelling and realistically action guiding. The lexical 
solution notably generates a problem of “mixed-incentives”, namely that other states 
will face incentives to make small improvements in lexically decisive criteria even if 
causing a large worsening on some lower ranked criteria – opening one’s economy to 
international trade (say) may apparently ‘excuse’ widespread human rights violations 
or a crack-down on domestic dissent. The “multiple realms” solution risks rendering 
foreign policy decidedly, and possibly unsustainably, schizophrenic – being allies in 
some areas and strong antagonists in others is hard to maintain given the type of 
multi-area bargaining and engagement that characterises state relations. Finally, the 
‘ideal types’ approach to resolve the gradation problem could generate divergent 
assessments given its reliance on judgment rather than more clearly identifiable 
threshold evaluations. If the goal of the state classification approach is to act as a 
normative guide to foreign policy behaviour in the real world then the aforementioned 
problems would ultimately need to be addressed.  
 6 
In short: while almost everyone engaged in it recognises that accurately 
classifying states involves difficult empirical questions (is someone really respecting 
human rights, are their democratic procedures really robust?), the whole approach 
brings with it as well difficult normative choices, despite its apparent widespread use 
and genuine appeal to a great many people.  
  The existing literature on this topic mainly falls into two categories: 
discussions of Rawls’ particular proposals in LP, and examinations of the descriptive 
aspects of state classification as practiced by foreign policy actors. The goal of this 
paper is to draw upon but also step back from these debates and ask the broader 
question: is state classificationism plausible as a distinct general normative approach? 
If so, what problems will any such account have to overcome, and how optimistic 
should we be that it will succeed?6  
   
 
II. STATE CLASSIFICATION: REAL WORLD PRACTICE 
From the perspective of normative theory, discussions of the “state categorisation” 
approach to foreign policy making have gained prominence most significantly 
following Rawls’s LP and several subsequent extended discussions and critiques (a 
very good overview is Williams 2010, and for some of the canonical criticisms see 
Pogge 1994; Buchanan 2000; Beitz 2000, Caney 2002, and Shue 2002 with Wenar 
                                                        
6  Of the two authors, one is reasonably skeptical of the likelihood of success, the other 
cautiously optimistic. We both agree however that such judgements can only be justified if 
we have a clear sense of the approach’s challenges and resources. 
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2006, and Reidy 2007 offering some replies).7 Some will immediately resist the idea 
that LP can reasonably be considered as a form of state classificationism. They will 
point out that LP is a realistic utopia (1999, 11), to use Rawls’ expression, that the 
eight principles of LP and the companion idea of well-ordered peoples are part of 
ideal theory (1999, 4-5), and that Rawls explicitly rejects the use of the term ‘states’ 
(1999, 23-30) precisely because he wants to avoid relying on agents that mirror the 
actual behaviour of political communities in the international system.  
 In line with what has been argued above, our reply is deflationary. First, let us 
assume that the aforementioned understanding of Rawls is the correct one. Even if so, 
the basic project of this paper is not affected. LP is a (putative) illustration of the idea 
of state classificationism – its cogency (as an illustration) does not settle the question 
of whether the approach is itself cogent (the focus of our discussion). Furthermore, 
even if LP is a pure ideal theory, it will need to be somehow applied, and that might 
necessitate some form of state classificationism (see notably Doyle 2006 and Forster 
2014).  
In a similar way, note that some have criticized Rawls’ LP for using an 
excessively ‘rigid’ theoretical framework (see for example Caney 2002, 104, but also 
Shue 2002). A theory that wants to be ‘Realistically Utopian’ (1999, 5-7) and of use 
as a guide to the foreign policy of liberal democratic regimes (1999, 8, 83), cannot be 
grounded in categorical distinctions ill-befitting the complexity of international 
politics. Yet, such criticisms often seem to rely on the assumption that applying LP’s 
framework would necessarily fall prey to what we describe below as the gradation 
and completeness problems (Caney 2002, 105). Hence it matters whether these 
                                                        
7 For more recent discussions of the implications of Rawls’ work for international theory and 
practice see Williams 2011; Riker 2014, 2009; Neufeld 2013; Reinhardt 2012; Forster 2014; 
Lister 2012; Eckert 2015.  
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concerns can be defused by reconceptualising the way in which state classifications 
are approached.  
Secondly, whatever the ‘right’ interpretation of Rawls, the broader approach is 
worth taking seriously because of a perhaps less appreciated fact: that this is plausibly 
how significant numbers of powerful state actors approach the problem.  
Indeed, there has been a steadily expanding body of research, going back to at 
least the 1960s, whereby foreign policy scholars in understanding how states 
construct their foreign policy have looked to the type of representations that leaders 
and elites (which are often considered the prime movers of policy formation within 
state bureaucracies) have of their own polity and of those with whom they interact on 
the international scene (Hudson 2008). This approach now has a lot of nuance to it, 
but the general idea, broadly stated, is that states form both self- and other- oriented 
role representations and these ‘self-conceptions’ or ‘images’ are then used to structure 
and orientate a state’s interaction with other states.  
Such classifications can be relatively rich – witness for example an early 
classic in this literature, Holsti’s National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign 
Policy (1970), which identifies close to 20 different main ways in which countries can 
perceive their role in international society, ranging from ‘bastion of revolution’, to 
‘defender of the faith’.8 What matters for present purposes, however, is that this now 
quite large literature is premised on the extensive evidence that many state actors do 
seem to use the qualitative classification of other states (and their own) as a 
significant guide to their foreign policy.  
                                                        
8 A more recent updated elaboration of the approach is Krotz (2002), notably where how 
states classify themselves is argued to be an important determinant of foreign policy 
behaviour.  
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So why not simply use the way influential state actors classify states in the 
real world as the “correct” way of conducting state classifications? Well, two reasons, 
one pragmatic, one more fundamental. Firstly, influential actors have mixed 
incentives and so may not apply the categories consistently or in line with what their 
judgements might be absent self-interested considerations. Take, for instance, the 
US’s use of “rogue state”, a term relied upon in structuring foreign relations by the 
White House, the Pentagon, and the Department of State of several different 
administrations (see Hoyt 2000 and O’Reilly 2007).9 It’s then possible to use such 
designations to statistically identify the policy dimensions that typically trigger 
“rogue status”: a) the attempt to develop weapons of mass destruction; b) involvement 
with terrorism; c) posing a military threat; and d) challenging international norms 
(Hoyt 2000, 303). 
However, clearly this does not fully explain the actual classificatory choices 
made by the US government: though both India and Pakistan, for instance, have 
developed nuclear programs in open violation of international norms, they are not 
officially considered as potential rogues (O’Reilly 2007, 302-4). Even if partly 
adopting the “state classification” approach, the US does so with a certain degree of 
inconsistency, to say the least. States may also simply be cynically using the 
categories as a justificatory veneer for pre-determined behaviour. 
Secondly, however, and most importantly from a normative theorist’s 
perspective, we want to know how these categories should be justifiably applied and 
structured and what actions this should guide. The fact that many state actors adopt 
the broad approach seems to elevate it to the status of “the sort of approach that can 
                                                        
9 It’s often wrongly believed that this is simply an outgrowth of  the Bush Administration’s 
“war on terror” but, infact, it predates it. See, for example, Miles (2013 ch. 1 and ch. 2). 
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be implemented in the real world” and as such raises the question of this paper – is 
there a variant that has real world utility and can still be normatively both distinct and 
justified. Empirical practice cannot settle the latter question. 
 
 
III. STATE CLASSIFICATION: NORMATIVE REQUIREMENTS 
Clearly, a classificatory-based foreign policy is attractive to many, and seems to be 
part of the way a large number of states approach foreign policy making. Yet for any 
theory endorsing this to represent a distinct normative account it has to crucially not 
simply collapse into the following, very well-theorised, view:  
Foreign-Policy Reductivism (FPR): Any set of principles by which we 
classify states and use to guide foreign policy are all ultimately justified 
by reference to one underlying value or combined scalar metric.  
This, of course, is straightforwardly the case for utilitarians and for most 
consequentialists generally, though the approach in practice need not at all always 
require the naïve direct pursuit of a single-goal, potentially involving the use of 
principles as rules-of-thumb with allied dispositions (Hooker 2000), as self-
commitment devices (Elster 1979, 2000), and as coordination tools or epistemic 
shortcuts (Hardin 1988). FPR also captures the position of a range of nationalists or 
those advocating national self-interest as the supreme test of policies, and for that 
matter those aimed at perpetuating stable rule by the current executive. This also 
could be a coherent position of a range of libertarian positions where the underlying 
value was liberty as some sort of non-interference or non-coercion (Lomasky 2001).  
Ultimately though, when FPR adopts a set of principles to classify states these 
hinge for their justification on the empirical question of whether adopting the 
 11 
principles promotes the underlying value (be it overall utility, welfare, peace, stable 
rule, liberty or whatever). As such while FPR is clearly one way of classifying states 
according to some of their defining features, it doesn’t exhaust the approach as a 
whole and if it were the only justifiable type of theory, the classificatory approach 
would lose its normative distinctiveness.  
What is it to be normatively distinct to reductionist approaches? Two theories 
are normatively distinct in the sense used here to the extent they disagree on two 
dimensions: (i) the type of factors that determine ethical evaluations and (ii) the 
content of these factors. To give an example, a deontological theory will be 
significantly normatively distinct to a consequentialist one – disagreeing on both 
criteria – whereas consequentialist theories typically disagree on the latter only (with 
exceptions). Thus when it comes to foreign policy, to be normatively distinct is to 
make such judgements on grounds that don’t ultimately collapse into an instrumental 
metric. To avoid this, it needs to adopt some variant of the following:  
Foreign Policy Non-Reductivism (FPNR): The principles by which we 
classify states and decide foreign policy thereof are not themselves 
reducible to one underlying value or combined scalar metric.  
The question philosophically, however, is how to set out and justify such an 
approach so it doesn’t ultimately collapse into a single-value or single-metric 
reductivist view. Why does identifying normatively distinct approaches matter? Well, 
because of two main reasons. First, because identifying distinct approaches helps us 
be clear on the sources of disagreement. For foreign policy reductivists there are two, 
and only two, possible sources of disagreement: (a) what the underlying value should 
be; and (b) the empirical question of how actions affect the pursuit of (a). For non-
reductivists there are minimally three: (a) what the different non-collapsible 
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underlying values should be; (b) how conflicts between these values should be 
resolved; and (c) the empirical question of how actions affect the pursuit of (a) and 
(b). If we can work out which approach is better justified we can gain, in the process, 
a better understanding of the potential sources of disagreement (and convergence) 
between possible theories.  
Second, because FPNR relatively straightforwardly captures the way many 
reflective individuals talk and approach foreign policy, specifically capturing the 
intuition that certain principles cannot be “traded”, that, say, economic growth, human 
rights protections, territorial sovereignty and democratic governance draw upon 
different ideals and cannot, ultimately, be simply justified by reference to welfare (or 
well-being, or whatever the underlying metric). Foreign Policy Non-Reductivism, 
unlike its conceptual rival, could for instance justify the sense that there is something 
decidedly distasteful about condoning widespread human rights violations if doing so 
yields a sufficiently higher probability of a growth-enhancing trade relationship.10 Put 
in a slightly different way, FPNR is in line with many people’s considered 
convictions about the non-tradability of some moral values, and thus it is important, 
for those committed to achieving reflective equilibrium, to explore whether a form of 
state classificationism based on FPNR is normatively and conceptually plausible. 
Some may immediately object11 that the negative appearance of FPR might be 
reduced by the underlying value being suitably noble – such as, for example, world 
peace. This is true, but only to an extent. While it’s certainly the case that how 
                                                        
10  And the distaste here is not really addressed by hoping all-good-things ultimately go 
together, that for instance protesting human rights abuses will always lead to better growth-
enhancing governance. It might, but it might not. 
11 We would like to thank one of the anonymous referees for encouraging us to address this 
particualr objection.  
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‘distasteful’ a single-value theory is will depend on the content of that value,  there 
still seem to be something troubling about seeing the world in that way. Only caring 
about world peace – and not also about say liberty and human health – would seem to 
many as ignoring morally important interests (with this depending crucially on how 
encompassing the value is). Furthermore, note that, often, these ‘ecompassing values’ 
are internally complex and that their specification tends to uncover specific conditions 
that contribute to make their realization worthwile. To illustrate, ‘world peace’ is 
underdetermined: it can be modelled along the lines of a ‘pax Romana’ or according 
to a Kantian ‘feudum pacificum’. Not only would these two conceptions of world 
peace be different, but what makes the second more attractive is precisely the fact that 
its attainment is made conditional on other values (e.g. mutual recognition between 
political communities) that are conceptually distinct and morally defensible on their 
own terms. 
How then might Foreign Policy Non-Reductivism be different in practice? 
The most plausible option here appears to be to appeal to certain “defining features” 
that express a series of values that themselves are not reducible to a single metric. 
(Why is this the most plausible option? Well, the demonstration is by counter-
positive: assume that the values underlying these distinct categories are the same or 
can be compared by certain weights – in that case we have implicitly adopted a single 
metric representing the underlying weighting or underlying ideal. Hence we must 
have a theory-structure where this doesn’t hold).  
And indeed, it’s no coincidence that Rawls’ LP – arguably the only fully 
spelled out systematic (normative) theory of Foreign Policy Non-Reductivism – does 
exactly this: it sets out the defining features of various political structures and 
behaviours, and uses these to determine justified international ethical behaviour.  
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Rawls uses the term ‘peoples’ to describe what he calls liberal and decent 
political communities with three further images, namely, burdened societies, 
benevolent absolutisms and outlaw states, with these categories based on how these 
agents behave in various “realms” (domestic political affairs, the amount of social and 
political capital, interstate conflict, adherence to various international norms and 
behaviours).12 What is relevant here is that the classifications then partly determine 
liberal peoples’ justified foreign policy stance: decent peoples should be tolerated as 
equal members in good standing of what Rawls calls the Society of Peoples, burdened 
societies should be helped through a duty of assistance to become well-ordered, 
benevolent absolutisms - though mostly neglected in LP - are to be considered as 
sovereign over their people and territory given that they respect human rights and are 
externally peaceful and, finally, outlaw states should be the object of coercive 
measures, ranging from sanctions to military intervention.  
 What Rawls can be thought to provide then is an approach to state 
classification that doesn’t collapse into an instrumental metric13 (such as, for example, 
consequentialist accounts), and isn’t undermined by the observation that in practice 
states often classify other states in a much more messy and inconsistent manner than 
                                                        
12 Some will object that we are forgetting the role of the LP’s eight principles: aren’t they 
what guide foreign policy behaviour for Rawls? Of course they are relevant, but (i) the 
principles are ‘selected’ after Rawls has described the main features of the parties (including 
their basic interests) to the first international orginal position (i.e. liberal peoples) and (ii) the 
principles themeselves specify constraints for membership in the Society of Peoples, but do 
not provide a full account of foreign policy. 
13 There is a possible interpretation of LP that sees it as purely instrumentalist – such as to 
world peace. Neither author thinks this is the best interpretation, but if the reader accepts it 
then the references to LP throughout should be interpreted as referring to a hypothetical 
alternative where the justification was not meant as purely instrumentalist in the sense 
previously discussed.  
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their official rhetoric claims. The approach in general is attractive, it seems to capture 
a standard that states are (imperfectly) aiming for, and arguably well-coheres with 
many people’s considered judgements. This does not mean however that FPNR lacks 
philosophical and empirical problems.  
 
 
IV. PROBLEMS: COMPLETENESS AND GRADATION 
Rawls’ approach to international ethics is a potential variant of FPNR and as such 
useful for illustrating its broader problems, in particular those relating to the degree of 
rigidity in the classificatory criteria and to the real-world implications that such 
rigidity could potentially have.  
First, note how Rawls seems to describe political communities through a set of 
necessary criteria. For example, a liberal people is such if: (i) it is organized on the 
model of a constitutional democracy; (ii) its citizens are united by ‘common 
sympathies’; and (iii) it has a moral nature (1999, 23-4). As such, if any of the 
aforementioned conditions is not met, one should conclude that the object in question 
is not a liberal people. However, this would seem to create the apparent paradox that, 
for example, a political community institutionally organized as a constitutional 
democracy might not be considered a liberal people in the absence of, say, common 
sympathies shared by its citizens.14 We are entitled to ask the broader question: what 
if a state does not meet one of the conditions that define it as a specific object (i.e. 
type of people), but meets all the other relevant conditions? 15 Sometimes, admittedly, 
                                                        
14 This is not as unlikely  as it might be initially thought. Many liberal democratic states in the 
real world contain more than one people (and thus, one might conjecture, more than one set of 
‘common sympathies’ within the same insitutional structure).   
15 Here we follow and expand on Caney 2002, p. 104. 
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it might be that failing one or some of the standards for membership of the relevant 
type can ipso facto push a people in a different group: for example, sticking to Rawls’ 
categories for purposes of illustration, a benevolent absolutism16 that is externally 
aggressive may simply become an outlaw state. However, this need not be the case 
for all relevant standards. Once again, consider a political community that only 
protects a subset of the basic liberal constitutional freedoms, or one that has a deeply 
liberal and secular value system but only an insufficient commitment to democratic 
voting mechanisms and procedures.  How are we to classify it? 
We can call this the completeness problem, namely that even if we think of the 
relevant set of standards that comprise a state-classification as each being capable of 
being met or not, then it’s still the case that a state might meet some and not others. 
This raises the pressing problem of how to classify a state when this happens.  
As an example of the completeness problem consider China and the realm of 
human rights. Imagine, for the purposes of this example, that one is committed to a 
version of FPNR where respect for a clear set of basic human rights is central to 
determine the classification of a state. The Chinese state has what is widely regarded 
as a remarkably bad record on human rights (Foot 2000). If one were to focus on 
political rights, then China appears to have a sustained and well-thought through 
institutional apparatus whose effect is to actively repress the political rights of its 
members. However, the latter picture is severely complicated by the fact that China’s 
bureaucracy is also responsible for what is, according to many, potentially the largest 
successful exercise in lifting people out of desperate poverty in the history of 
                                                        
16 Rawls defines benevolent absolutisms as political communities that respect the basic rights 
of their members, are externally peaceful, but fail to provide any meaningful form of political 
participation mechanisms to their citizens. See Rawls (1999, 90).   
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humankind.17 In so doing the Chinese government can be credited with preventing a 
dramatically large amount of human suffering (and consequently credited for the 
partial fulfilment of a central class of basic human rights, namely, what Shue (1980) 
famously called subsistence rights).18 Thus when it comes to human rights, how do 
we classify China? To simply classify it as an ‘outlaw state’ would be reductive of the 
complexity of the case in hand.  
Now, one thought here might be that, in practice, states with poor behaviour 
on some human rights are likely to have poor behaviour on other such rights, so we 
might still have mostly complete classifications in this realm. This seems empirically 
plausible at least. But as an observation it understates the broader difficulties, for 
while many states do often have reasonably consistently good / bad / mediocre stances 
within a particular realm (e.g. domestic human rights, economic development and 
institutions, political structures, respect for borders, international cooperation etc.) 
there is frequently really stark variance between realms. There are states that are 
peaceable and corrupt (Morocco), 19  those that are democratic yet seem to be 
constantly engaged in non-internationally authorised military action in other states 
                                                        
17 For an extended analysis of the complex and multifaceted reception of human rights norms 
in China see Peerenboorm (2005) and Svensson (2002). 
18 This example relies on accepting subistance rights as key human rights, but the overall 
point can be applied to any such multiple-rights conception. In other words, nothing hinges on 
which rights one sees as human rights. Whatever the answer to that question it is possible to 
construct an alternative example that illustrates the same problem.  
19  For a useful international contextualising of Morocco’s problems with corruption see 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results. Nothing hinges on accepting the validity of the 
classifications provided by transparency international.   
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(such as the US), those that are highly economically developed but stifle dissent (such 
as Singapore)20 and so on.  
What these examples illustrate is that the completeness problem is likely to 
apply to a vast array of classificatory exercises based on widely accepted values such 
as external peacefulness, well-functioning internal institutions, and the representative 
character of government. More specifically, any criteria for classifying states will 
most plausibly cover different realms of activity and types of institution, and as a 
result we should expect a failure of completeness to be very common. While 
conceptually this is still an issue of completeness, it deserves highlighting as the most 
empirically likely manifestation of this problem (call it perhaps the “different realms 
case”), namely if the criteria used to classify a state pertain to more than one realm 
(e.g. external peacefulness and respect for basic human rights at home), and as often 
is the case state behaviour varies very significantly between those realms (e.g. a state 
violates basic rights but is largely externally peaceful), then we will likely end up with 
a “mixed” classification. 
Secondly, as well as states often meeting some criteria and not others, it also 
seems to usually be the case in practice that most of the obvious criteria used to 
classify states can be met to different degrees.21 It’s not that there are simply some 
states which violate human rights and others which do not - many political 
communities violate some human rights, respect other human rights, and do a ‘half-
baked’ job on yet more. The case of existing liberal democracies is particularly 
striking in this respect, at least if one adopts the Rawlsian framework in LP: given 
                                                        
20 See for instance https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/singapore.  As with 
footnote 19, nothing in the argument hinges on accepting this specific illustrative case. 
21 Once again we follow and expand on Caney (2002, 104). 
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what Rawls considers to be a liberal people, the chances of an actual political 
community fully meeting these requirements are low, bordering the non-existent. 
Note, furthermore, that the issue here is not about the interpretation of the 
criteria and the difficulties don’t merely stem from the uncertainty and perhaps 
indeterminacy inherent in general moral and political principles. It’s true, for 
example, that different conceptions of human rights may individuate different central 
classes of such rights as a function of their differing philosophical groundings.22 Yet, 
even if there was complete agreement on the content of the criteria, the problem 
would still stand insofar as meeting the criteria in question is often a matter of 
degrees. Call this the gradation problem, namely that in a particular realm any 
standards or criteria may be met to a certain extent, not placing a state cleanly in one 
category or another. 
As an example of the gradation problem consider the United States. Here, for 
purposes of illustration, consider a state classification approach in which the securing 
of a wide range of political and economic rights is central to being considered a 
liberal state. Bar exceptionally creative judgments, the US is usually seen as a liberal 
democracy: most rights from the constitutional tradition are guaranteed, its citizens 
share at least some common sympathies, and the constitution requires that the 
political system should be organized on the model of a representative democracy. 
However, it is also fair to say that the US political system does not guarantee the full 
array of basic subsistence rights of all its members,23 while the role of capital in the 
                                                        
22 Witness, say, the difference between traditional views such as Griffin (2007) and so-called 
political approaches such as Beitz (2010). 
23  For a classic, and in many respects unsurpassed, analysis of the deficiencies of the 
American health care system and the importanc of health provisions for basic justice see 
Daniels (1985). 
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political process does not seem to afford ‘fair value’ to the political liberties for all 
citizens (Bartels 2008). It secures some rights fully, some partially. How do we 
classify the US?24 
The completeness problem and gradation problem are importantly different. 
The completeness problem arises because if we have some set of thresholds to meet a 
classification in a particular realm (such as domestic affairs or trade or respect for 
international norms etc.) then it is possible that a state might meet some and not 
others, and it is likely that there will be quite a few states that meet the criteria in one 
realm and fail them in another (the different realms case). The gradation problem is 
that in the real world states often only meet a threshold to a certain degree or in a 
fractured manner. That is, schematically, if meeting an “A” classification requires 
doing/being a1, a2 and a3: 
(i) One state could, for example, meet a1 and a2 but not a3 (a problem of 
completeness); 
(ii) One state could meet a1 fully, a2 partially, and a3 weakly (a problem 
of gradation). 
                                                        
24 Again, it’s possible to argue with the contemporary case, but we can instead think of the 
US’s history of civil rights progress: it seems plausible that there wasn’t any single moment 
when it became a full liberal democracy but rather that there were a series of partial 
improvements on access to the franchise, protection from egregious race-based state violence, 
and a somewhat weakening of institutional discrimination. Even if you (controversially) think 
that the US does currently fully meet all the relevant criteria, there was clearly a point in time 
where it met very few of them, and many points inbetween where they were partially met. 
The same would presumably be true of the history of almost all countries currently described 
as liberal democracies (European states with histories of colonialism, for instance, would 
have been historically evaluated in a very mixed manner). Gradation, in other words, can be 
taken to be both a synchronic and/or diachronic problem, and even those confident that all 
modern developed democracies are fully liberal would have to concede that this was not 
always the case, and may not be the case for various states in transition in the future. 
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While these seem like abstract problems, they are not difficulties anyone sympathetic 
to the approach should happily leave unresolved. For one of the distinctive features of 
state classificationism is that it should be able to provide (indirectly, at the very least) 
actual guidance with respect to the attitudes and foreign policy engagement of a given 
state with respect to the international community and foreign polities. Rawls’ work on 
international ethics, for example, promises to be a normatively salient guide to the 
foreign policy of existing liberal democratic peoples. Yet, if the latter promise is to be 
kept, any framework that relies on “defining features”, given the problems of 
completeness and gradation, will need to be adapted at least to some extent.  
 This action-guidance also helps highlight the scope of these challenges – do 
they for example apply to all such classifications, such as that of Freedom House or of 
the Democracy Index? This depends on how the classifications are normatively used, 
for there are two different options here: one, as a way of summarising some data, or 
two, as an implied basis for deciding upon foreign policy. Officially both indexes are 
only the first, but they are sometime framed implicitly as the second, so serve as a 
useful example. Strictly speaking though, it is only classifications that then partly 
determine foreign policy actions that count as an example of the normative approach 
being discussed. Hence, the focus on foreign policy guidance.  
 One final thing of note. A reviewer has suggested that the extent of these 
difficulties in principle should depend on the number of variables or defining features. 
This seems to us an important observation and a potential practical argument for 
theoretical parsimony since the theory here is meant to be also action guiding.  
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V. SOME ANSWERS: COUNTING PRINCIPLES AND IDEAL TYPES 
Section four took the most obvious and straightforward theory structure of state 
classificationism – that where categories have a set of defining features, the structure 
indeed that Rawls seems to adopt – and raised a series of problems any such theory 
seems likely to encounter. In what follows we discuss some possible changes that in 
principle could overcome the difficulties, and in the subsequent section we note a few 
of the downsides each of these brings.  
The first sympathetic change is directed at the completeness problem, which, 
recall, is that objects of classification defined by a set of necessary conditions may 
only meet some of the relevant criteria and thus not fall into any one camp. However, 
note that this arises due to a specific way of conceiving of the definition of the 
categories. One could hold instead that states should be classified through some 
appropriately weighted good-making features with a partial lexical ranking (yielding 
quite a diverse set of sufficient conditions and ranking of different states within the 
category).  
For example, we can take the following four parameters25 for triggering rogue 
status and make the criteria of ‘rogueness’ ordered as follows, where the sign ‘>’ 
indicates the level of importance of the criterion for ascribing the label: (a) the 
attempt to develop weapons of mass destruction > (b) involvement with international 
terrorism > (c) posing military threats > (d) challenging international norms. The 
lexical rankings would then allow us to be more confident in assessing and comparing 
cases where some criteria are satisfied, but not all of them are. For example, one 
could define a rogue state as a state that meets at least one of the first two criteria by 
order of importance ((a) and (b) in this case) or, alternatively, satisfies any three of 
                                                        
25 Here we follow Hoyt (2000, 302) for the content of the parameters and their discussion. 
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them. In the same way, this approach would also allow more easily discernible 
comparisons of ‘rogueness’ levels (e.g. country X adopting behaviour described by 
(a), (b), and (c) is ‘roguer’ than country Y adopting behaviour described by (b), (c), 
and (d)). 
Needless to say one would have to provide a justification for the precise 
lexical ordering, one that does not rely on some version of FPR. In other words, to 
retain the classificatory approach as normatively distinct, the ranking of the criteria 
should not be justified according to a single value or combined metric. The latter, 
however, is not insurmountable. While all versions of FPR can potentially generate a 
lexical ordering of criteria, not all lexical orderings of a set of criteria need to rely on 
a single metric approach.  
To illustrate, the ranking of the four features of ‘rogueness’ we have just 
suggested could be developed by citing different types of moral considerations such 
as the importance of peace and stability in the international system (so that weapons 
of mass destruction should not proliferate), the relevance of the principle of non-
combatant immunity (which would disqualify support for terrorism), and the idea of 
the general obligation to follow valid legal norms (which would support respect for at 
least some international norms). In turn, their ranking could be developed by 
conducting pairwise comparisons between different ordering using Scanlon’s 
reasonable rejectability contractualist methodology or, alternatively, by relying on the 
construction of a suitably defined evaluative standpoint (Scanlon 2000).26  
                                                        
26More broadly, and without delving too much into the suggested solution, the relevant point 
is that FPRN approaches seem to be able to avail themselves of broadly constructivist 
methodologies to produce a lexical ordering without necessarily having to accept some form 
of FPR. Rawls’ original position is perhaps the most famous illustration of the claim that 
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A second option for overcoming or at least blunting the completeness problem 
– and in particular its most prominent manifestation, the “different realms case”– is to 
hold that we should simply classify states in area specific ways and our foreign policy 
should be very different depending on our type of engagement. We could, for 
example, maintain good economic links with those states that respect international 
treaties and yet seek to exclude them from a range of multinational bodies if they 
engage in domestic suppression. States as such would be evaluated in each “realm” – 
economic structures, human rights, domestic political institutions and behaviour, 
respect for borders and so on – and this would define our relations for a range of 
interactions germane to that realm. This is clearly an approach that has been adopted 
in several actual foreign policy scenarios, including, most notably, the relationship 
between Iran and some of its European commercial partners (at the time of writing – 
2016/17). 
This – as we note below – is not an option without problems, but it does at 
least seem to defuse some of the difficulties of completeness (and incidentally reflect 
how many states try to prevent “trade missions” with non-liberal states from talking 
about human rights or border disputes).   
The possibilities for overcoming the gradation problem are different. Recall 
that the gradation problem arose because it is extremely unlikely that any political 
community could realistically fully meet the defining features of a given category, 
more specifically, that their compliance with a particular requirement is often going to 
be a matter of degree rather than a ‘yes/no’ scenario.  
                                                                                                                                                              
lexical orderings do not require the use of a single metric approach but can still be determined 
from a unified evaluative standpoint. 
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Here again it is important to note that the gradation problem relies on a 
specific conceptualization of the nature of the defining features of a given category, 
namely being based on thresholds or conditions. Empirically though these seem likely 
to be often partially met, or met in fragmented ways.  
However, a different but sympathetic approach would be to take the “defining 
features” to represent that of an ideal type to which an instance can be closer or 
further away from based on some sort of family resemblance.27  The conceptual shift 
seems to relieve, at least to some degree, the need to view actual existing states as 
solely meeting the requirements or not.28  
One reasonable objection here would be that considering state classifications 
as ideal types creates a problem of indeterminacy. The basic issue is that if a given 
category stands for an ideal type, and as such is not something for which we can 
simply take its defining features as conditions for normatively labelling real world 
instances, then we still need to decide the extent to which an object is “closer” or 
“further” from the ideal type, that is how well it has to match the relevant features that 
define a category in order to fall under it. To illustrate, let us assume the category 
‘liberal democracy’ is an ideal type constituted by, say, the following two features: (i) 
respect for the basic freedoms that are familiar from the constitutional tradition; (ii) a 
system of governance that embodies political equality by giving each adult citizen one 
vote, and by adequately protecting the fair value of the political liberties. The 
question, then, is to what extent a country can be considered a liberal democracy 
                                                        
27 This seems to be the approach implictly used by Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995. 
28 Again, one further intrepretation of Rawls suggested by one of the reviewers was that this 
might be how LP is best conceived. If so, one could then start with the subsequent problems, 
and additionally try to provide an account of how the LP’s guidance would concretely work 
in real world contexts. 
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given that we are prepared to see the latter category as an ideal type to which no 
country will perfectly conform.     
Our answer is that, without rejecting the whole approach, such sort of difficult 
assessments are probably unavoidable. There simply is no escape from the fact that 
real-world classifications according to ideal types are subject to some degree of 
judgment and sometimes will not be clear-cut. However, while unavoidable the 
problem is not utterly disabling. To say that a classificatory exercise is subject to 
some level of indeterminacy is not to say that it is groundless.29 The point, rather, is to 
develop justificatory strategies in order to provide reasons for a specific type of 
classificatory choice. One strategy could be to start from those central cases in which 
we feel more confident about the classification. For example, for the ideal type 
‘liberal democracy’ as defined above, one could start from specific examples such as 
the Scandinavian countries in order to determine the extent to which the relevant 
criteria are met by what we normally consider to be the best case(s) of real world 
exemplification(s) of the ideal type. One could then move on to examine other 
countries that are standardly considered as liberal democracies according to ordinary 
and historically repeated political judgements, such as the United Kingdom and 
France, in order to compare them to the cases where we are more confident and 
establish if they are sufficiently similar. The method could then be reiterated by 
conducting pairwise comparisons between what are believed to be the central cases 
and those that are less clear-cut.   
                                                        
29  While not in principle disabling from a particular agent’s evaluative standpoint – 
indeterminacy is after all a feature of much judgement – it does risk conflict between different 
agents. On this see the section six. The solution we are suggesting does not however collapse 
into the gradation problem as instances within a category can be further or closer to the 
‘boundaries’, with this being affected by partial or fractured compliance.       
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Note also that, so far, we have discussed the conceptual presuppositions of 
conducting classificatory exercises as a static and self-contained task. In other words, 
the analysis we have conducted relied on two assumptions: (1) that the objects of 
classification do not change as we are trying to classify them; and (2) that their 
features cannot be explained in terms of factors that are outside of their control. Both 
assumptions can be challenged. However, weakening them actually allows us to make 
progress on the gradation problem by providing a more sophisticated way of 
structuring our judgements.  
As an example of a challenge to assumption (1) consider the role of 
intentions.30  Thus far, we have assumed that a state’s “intentions”, very broadly 
understood, are irrelevant to how we classify them. The assumption is controversial. 
To illustrate, imagine that you are trying to classify a moderately autocratic country 
with a relatively decent human rights record.31 Does it matter that such country has 
been (ex-hypothesis) reforming its constitutional structures in the direction of a much 
more participatory role for its citizens? Many would be inclined to think that it 
should. One way to find a place for the latter idea is to make clear that it can affect the 
way in which we structure our judgments in the context of the gradation problem. For 
example, in the context of pairwise comparisons, intentions may prove to be useful 
ways of assessing a ‘direction of travel’ that includes various judgements of what the 
state is likely to be like subsequently. This might notably also be something that 
impacts the foreign policy measures, in effect intentions indicating both a destination 
and a process that we may wish to buttress (or if negative, to undermine).       
                                                        
30 For an excellent discussion of this issue see Forster (2014). She uses the idea of ‘aspiration’ 
to convey the importance of attitudinal features.  
31 For a real life example, consider Singapore.  
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Now consider one way to challenge assumption (2). States are placed in an 
environment (international society) that routinely affects their internal make-up and 
external behaviour. Some may thus be sceptical that classificatory exercises can have 
any meaningful point unless they also reflect the fact that membership in international 
regimes and organizations and the wider international context significantly affects 
how states behave both externally and internally. The latter claims are often seen as 
central to both liberal and institutionalist approaches to international relations 
(Moravcsik, 1997; Legro and Moravcsik, 1999). To illustrate, compare the proportion 
of a state’s budget that goes towards defence with that allocated to the fulfilment of 
basic rights to subsistence. The relative weight of these expenditures may be affected 
by both membership in international organizations and the geopolitical environment 
in which a country is placed. For example, a state facing repeated challenges to its 
territorial integrity by its neighbours may commit more resources to its defence 
budget which, in the context of moderate scarcity, may affect its ability to protect 
subsistence rights. Should such external constraints affect the way in which we 
classify the state in question? Intuitively, many would be inclined to think that it 
should. What is relevant, for the purposes of our argument is that, once again, 
challenging the assumption that we can classify states without looking at the context 
in which they operate is useful in identifying further sources of input for the gradation 
judgments. It signals that we should take into account (as one plausible source of 
input) the kinds of constraints that international society, broadly construed, places on 
its members. 
 To sum-up; in section four we highlighted how the classificatory approach to 
foreign policy suffers from two main problems, that of completeness and of gradation. 
In section five we suggested that categories could be defined by counting principles 
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which are partially lexically ordered, that they could be realm-specific, and that the 
overall classifications could be viewed as constituting ideal types to which an instance 
can be closer to or further from. The use of counting principles to define categories 
avoids the rigidity of necessary conditions and combining this with some lexical 
rankings justified through a broadly constructivist method ensures we are not 
(implicitly) collapsing everything to one underlying metric and thus adopting FPR. 
Making things realm-specific allows us to tailor our relations by area and thus to 
respond to states doing markedly differently in particular realms. And conceiving of 
the defining features of a category as ideal types potentially allows us to make 
judgements of closeness or distance from the category and thus to respond to the fact 
that real world states conform unevenly and partially to most qualitative standards.  
 
 
VI. NEW PROBLEMS: JUDGMENT CONFLICTS, INCENTIVES AND 
SCHIZOPHRENIA 
The aforementioned solutions are, in our view, the obvious ways of making progress 
in order to make the state classification approach conceptually more defensible and 
specifically able to overcome what we have highlighted as its main weaknesses. 
Before concluding, however, it’s worth noting a few of the difficulties raised by the 
very reconceptualization we have put forward. Such difficulties pertain to the 
effective action-guiding potential of the approach. We believe that any fully specified 
account of state classification would ultimately need to overcome (or deny) them. The 
three problems we want to highlight are: (a) the problem of conflicts of judgment; (b) 
the problem of mixed incentives; and (c) the problem of schizophrenic diplomacy. 
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These problems are raised by, respectively, the use of ideal types, the use of lexical 
rankings, and the use of realm-specific classifications. 
First, consider the problem of conflicts of judgment. One of the central moves 
in resolving the gradation problem was to conceive of the classifications as ideal 
types. Doing so partly relieved the criteria from having to be fully met in practice. 
However, as we noted above, there is likely to be more than one way to then perform 
the relevant exercise of deciding whether a specific state falls under a particular ideal 
type and they will, in all likelihood, significantly rely on judgment. In this picture, it 
seems probable that different state actors would be likely to end up with different sets 
of actual classifications. While the latter is not a decisive theoretical reason to 
abandon the use of ideal types, it at least puts pressure on its action-guiding potential. 
This is because even assuming that all states accept exactly the same state 
classification ideal types (by itself a very optimistic assumption), merely 
implementing the approach could still generate large disagreements.    
Second, consider the use of lexical rankings. One key thing that separates our 
somewhat reformulated state classification from being an instance of FPR is that the 
criteria that define a classification can be given a lexical ranking that does not reflect 
an underlying single metric. However, providing a lexical ordering can also 
potentially generate a problem of mixed incentives. In what follows we use the 
example of what Rawls calls benevolent absolutisms to concretely illustrate both how 
the lexical ranking approach could work and why it would generate this difficulty. 
 Recall that Rawls defines benevolent absolutisms as political communities that 
respect human rights and are externally peaceful (1999, 90). One way to 
operationalize the lexical ordering approach we have suggested above is to give 
priority (for the purposes of the classification) to a specific and easily observable 
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subset of human rights and to a restricted understanding of external peacefulness. For 
instance, it could be that to be considered a benevolent absolutism one would at a 
minimum have to respect the borders of one’s neighbours and not be engaged in the 
mass killing or enslavement of one’s own people and the violent persecution of 
religious minorities. In this picture, the lexical ordering could be justified by 
appealing to the centrality of physical integrity for the basic interests of individuals, 
and by recalling the importance of territorial integrity for collective self-
determination. In turn, a liberal state’s foreign policy towards a political community 
that is classified as a benevolent absolutism could, say, envisage full trade and 
diplomatic relations and a degree of internal non-interference.  
The downside of this sort of lexical approach, however, is that it creates the 
incentive to make progress on the lexically decisive criteria but to disregard those that 
affect where one lies within the category. For example, a state with a small border 
dispute and a relatively free press and civil society could as such gain full relations 
with liberal states were it to settle the border dispute and crack down on press 
freedoms, freedom of association and political dissent (assuming unchanged 
performance for what concerns the aforementioned basic human rights). The latter 
problem is that within the category of benevolent absolutisms as defined above there 
would, presumably, be wide variance in terms of respect for the full array of domestic 
human rights over and above the minimal idea that these rights preclude enslavement 
and mass murder. In the same way, there would likely be a great deal of practical and 
conceptual space between respecting the territorial integrity of other states and a 
peaceful foreign policy. This creates the potential for problematic incentives in 
situations where minor gains with respect to a specific criterion can become more 
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beneficial (for the would-be benevolent absolutism) than widespread large progress 
on lexically non-decisive criteria. 
Furthermore, the latter problem becomes particularly striking if relations are 
different based on the realm. If interstate economic relations, for instance, are only 
based on adherence to a set of international economic norms and standards then there 
is very little self-interested incentive for state actors to make progress in other realms 
such as human rights, positive political reform or the protection of vulnerable 
minorities.32    
Now perhaps this is all acceptable: we make the key criteria the ones that are 
most important. However, state classification does seem at a minimum here to need to 
provide some reassurance that non-lexically decisive criteria are not implicitly being 
jettisoned. The fact that under FPR every major action of a state may affect how they 
are treated by foreign liberal states does seem to better incentivise progress than 
having certain criteria that count in reaching a threshold of treatment and others that – 
while judged very important – do not. This is the problem of lexical rankings and the 
stark incentives they can create.  
Finally, the third difficulty accrues to the suggestion that states might be 
evaluated very differently in different realms. Someone could, as such, be a close 
economic ally, for example, and a security foe due to their support for various 
insurgent regimes and lack of respect for international law.33 In principle we might 
                                                        
32 Note how under FPR, by contrast, these different areas are somewhat “traded”, so that 
external recognition and productive inter-state relations, in principle at least, can be improved 
by making progress in a range of areas. Yet if there are lexical conditions in one area that 
bestow such relations then the other areas are de-incentivised.  
33 This type of situation is far from implausible. As noted above, it seems to be a feature of 
the relationship between European countries and Iran. For a specific illustration, think of the 
relationship between post-revolution Iran with Germany (see The Jerusalem Post, June 28th 
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have both a warm trade relationship and decidedly conflictual engagements in 
international bodies. In practice, however, this seems as though it would be 
sometimes too schizophrenic to be sustainable: when we engage with states we 
usually do so simultaneously in a range of areas, and based on a relatively consistent 
evaluation of the state. To be foes in one area and allies in another is theoretically 
possible, but presumably practically difficult, and the mixed messages (this is a state 
we approve of vs. this is a state we regard as behaving very badly) might be hard to 
sustain.  
Thus at a minimum any state-classificationism would need to address how one 
would maintain a consistent policy stance towards a foreign state if it was an ally in 
one realm and a foe in another (or some other strongly conflicting categories). States 
do do this – they can have strong economic relations even while engaged with each 
other in significant territorial or value-based disputes. But it does complicate the 
picture. It also, from the perspective of the non-liberal state, might produce quite a bit 
of antipathy even in the areas where there was strong co-operation: it is hard to be 
part of a government being strongly condemned by a foreign power and still to 
maintain real co-operation and trust in another area. One can fake it, but that 
undercuts some of the value of close relations.  
The problems we have highlighted so far are not necessarily insuperable. 
What they do indicate, however, is that if we want the state classification approach to 
be not only normatively attractive but also able to provide actual guidance in the real 
world, further progress is required. It is one thing to describe some category of polity 
based on its defining features – as Rawls’ does – and argue for how we should 
                                                                                                                                                              
2015). http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Analysis-Why-Germany-is-the-weakest-Western-
link-in-nuclear-talks-with-Iran-407350.    
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structure our relations with those that conform to it. Yet to be of pragmatic import we 
need to know how to use this to relate to states that don’t cleanly meet the 
classifications, and at the same time we need to do so and try to avoid perverse 
outcomes, overly schizophrenic foreign policy relations and persistent evaluative 
disagreement.  
 
 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
State classificationism seems to be a widespread empirical practice, and yet both 
conceptually and as a type of normative theory it is oddly under-theorised. The aim of 
this paper has been to explore whether the approach in general is attractive and viable, 
not just whether the detailed and specific judgements underlying different views about 
how to classify states are the right ones.  
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